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1. SUMMARY: The SG, on behalf of the NLRB, seeks 
review of theCA 7's denial of enforcement of the Board's 
bargaining order issued against resps. The issue presented 
by this interesting petition is whether application of the 
National Labor Relations Act (Act) to schools operated by the 
Roman Catholic Church, which teach both religious and secular 
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subjects, violates the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses 
of the First Amendment. 
2. FACTS: Resp The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, a 
corporation ~~operates two parochial secondary schools in 
Chicago, Quigley North and Quigl~y South. Prior to 1970 only 
boys who had a positive desire to enter the priesthood were 
admitted to these schools; since then, however, the admission 
requirement has been that the boy must demonstrate some interest 
in the priesthood or a potential for Christian leadership. Ap-
proximately 16% of the schools' graduates actually go on to study 
for the priesthood. Resp Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc . , 
operates five parochial schools in northeastern Indiana. These 
schools have a lower "degree of religious orientation" than the 
Quigley schools. 
During September and October 1975 representation elections 
It \\ . -
were held among the lay teachers at these schools; the Unions • .w.on 
and were certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of 
1/ 
the employees in the two units. After the resps refused to 
bargain with the Unions, complaints were issued against the 
employers, alleging that their conduct violated§§ 8(a)(5) and (1) 
of the Act. Resps admitted their refusal to bargain but contended, 
1/ 
The Union certified at the Quigley schools was the Quigley 
Education Association, an affiliate of the Illinois Education 
Association, while the Union at the Indiana schools was the 
Community Alliance for Teachers of Catholic High Schools. 
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as they had in the earlier representation proceedings, that 
the schools were "completely religious" and thus the Board should 
decline to exercise jurisdiction over them under its discretionary 
standard. Through a series of cases, the Board has developed two 
criteria for the exercise of its jurisdiction over private, re-
ligiously affiliated educational institutions: it will not assert 
jurisdiction over any nonprofit, private educational institution 
that has gross annual revenues of less than $1 million, and it will 
not assert jurisdiction over "institutions primarily religious and 
noncommercial in character and purpose, whose educational endeavors 
are limited essentially to furthering and nurturing their religious 
beliefs." Besides arguing that the schools fell within the latter 
\ 
criterion, resps also contended that the First Amendment prohibited 
the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over them. 
The Board concluded that resps had violated§§ S(a)(S) and 
(1), rejecting the employers' jurisdictional arguments. It held 
that resps were not entitled to relitigate the determinations made 
during the representation proceedings that the schools were not 
completely religious. As for the constitutional argument, the 
Board rejected it, relying on its previous decision in Cardinal 
Timothy Manning, Roman Catholic Archbishop of the Archdiocese of 
Los Angeles, 223 NLRB 1218, which is currently pending in theCA 9. 
There the Board held that the provisions of the Act do not inter-
fere with religious beliefs and that the regulation of labor 
relations does not violate the First Amendment 'when it involves a 
minimal intrusion of · religious conduct and is necessary to obtain 
- 4 -
that objective." Resps were ordered to bargain collectively 
with the Unions . 
...,/ The CA 7 denied enforcement of the Board's order. - .... 
First the court examined the Board's distinction between schools 
that are "completely religious" and those. that are merely relig-
iously associated. It found this dichotomy to provide no workable 
guide for the exercise of the Board's discretion, for under it no 
Roman Catholic secondary school could be characterized as completel: 
religious. Aft~r examining this Court's cases involving aid to 
parochial schools, theCA 7 stated that the Board's jurisdictional 
rule had the effect of "cruelly whip-sawing [resps'] schools by 
holding that institutions too religious to receive governmental 
assistance are not religious enough to be excluded from its regu-
lation." 
Having rejected the Board's attempt to distinguish between 
completely religious and religiously associated schools, the court 
then considered the constitutional question. It agreed with resps 
that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over resps' schools 
violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First 
Amendment. (The court referred to the Religion Clauses jointly 
because of its belief that "there has been some blurring of sharply 
honed differentiations" between them.) TheCA 7's decision was 
based on its view that the Board's order to bargain necessarily 
inhibited the bishops' authority to maintain parochial schools in 
accordance with ecclesiastical concern. As an example, the court 
said that a bishop might refuse to renew the contracts of all ~ay 
c --
- 5 -
~ teachers because he believed the union had adopted policies 
{ at odds with the religious character of the schools. While 
under ecclesiastical law the bishop would have the right to 
I 
take such action, he might be found guilty of an unfair labor 
practice fe.r do.:_ng so. 
The CA 7 distinguished permissible governmental 
regulations which are applicable to parochial schools, such as 
fire inspections, zoning laws, and compulsory attendance laws, 
as having no clear inhibiting potential upon the relationship 
between teachers and employers. It also noted that such regu-
lations are applicable to all schools, whereas public schools are 
expressly exempted from the Act. 
Finally, the court considered the Board's contention 
that, should an unfair labor charge be filed in a situation in 
which the bishop asserted that an employee was dismissed for 
reasons of religious doctri~e, the Board would try to make some 
"reasonable accommodation" to the religious purpose of the school. 
The court considered this attempt at accommodation to be un-
satisfactory because it would involve "the necessity of explanation 
and analysis, and probably verification and justification, of the 
doctrinal precept involved, all of which would itself erode the 
protective wall afforded by the constitutional right." 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that the decision below --is based on an erroneous understanding of the Act and the Board's 
role in enforcing its provisions. He says that if a church of-
ficial were to contend that an employee, allegedly discharged for 
- 6 -
union activity, was in fact fired for espousing heretical 
views, the Board's role would be limited to a determination 
whether the employer's alleged reason for the discharge was 
the actual one. The Board's inquiry would end once it was 
determined that the employee had not bee:.1 removed in an effort 
to interfere with his § 7 rights. The SG asserts that there 
is no reason to believe that requiring the church official to 
demonstrate that an employee was not discharged for a prohibited 
reason would deter him from taking the action he thought necessary 
with regard to that employee. The prospect of impermissible 
governmental entanglement with religious affairs is wholly con-
jectural at this point, he says. Furthermore, even if it could be 
shown that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over parochial 
schools had the effect of regulating conduct based upon religious 
convictions, the SG contends that it would be justified by the 
compelling interest in preventing economic strife and the disrup-
tion of commerce. Finally, the SG says that the petition should be 
granted because the decision below could jeopardize labor relations 
in the more than 10,000 parochial schools in the United States, in 
many of which the collective bargaining process has been working 
smoothly. 
Resps contend that there is no reason for the Court to 
review the decision below, for "the Seventh Circuit's application 
of the governing law is unassailable." They stress that this case 
concerns only teachers and that no First Amendment objection is 
raised here to the Board's possible assumption of ju~isdiction over 
- 7 -
janitors or similar employees. Like the court below, resps 
contend that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over their 
schools would necessarily involve government intrusion into 
religious concerns. They say that if the Board divines the 
theological base3 for the bishop's action and reinforces his 
authority in a labor dispute, it will run afoul of the 
Establishment Clause; on the other hand, if it ignores the 
theological concerns and resolves disputes strictly on industrial 
standards, it will transgress the Free Exercise Clause. 
4. ·niSCUSSION: The issue presented is an important one, 
which in my opinion should be given plenary consideration by the 
Court. The only reason I see for denying the present petition 
is that currently pending in the CAs 3, 7, and 9 are similar cases 
challenging the constitutionality of the Act's application to 
religiously affiliated schools. It might be helpful to have the 
views of those circuits on the· question before ruling on it. On 
the other hand, this petition is presently before the Court, and it 
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2. 
charge of the schools violates the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment. The case also presents the question whether the NLRB 
violated statutory or constitutional constraints either in 
formulating or in applying the self-imposed jurisdictional 
standard under which it acted. 
1. Summary of the case: Two cases involving ~ 
different groups of Catholic high schools were consolidated in 
the CA 7. In each case, an association of lay teachers in the -
several schools within the group petitioned the NLRB for 
certification as bargaining representative of the lay teachers. 
The Bishops responsible for the schools (also referred to infra 
as"the employers") opRosed certification on two grounds. They 
argued, first, tha~nder the NLRB's own jur,isdictional 
standards, the schools should be considered "completely ,......_...,. 
religious" and so not subject to NLRB jurisdiction. 1 
The employer's second argument was tha~sertion of jurisdiction 
by the NLRB would be a violation of the First Amendment's 
Religion Clauses. 
1. In 1970 the NLRB began to assert jurisdiction over private 
educational institutions. But the NLRB declined to extend its 
jurisdiction to private schools that it found to be "completely 
religious," that is, devoted exclusively to teaching religion and ..._______.,. 
religious subjects. Where teaching was not limited to religious 
subjects, however, the NLRB termed the schools "religiously 
associated" and asserted jurisdiction. 
,• 
3. 
The NLRB rejected both of these arguments and ordered 
elections in the two units composed of the two groups of 
schools. In each election the union won and was certified by the 
NLRB as the bargaining representative of the lay faculty. 
The ~refused to bargain, and the NLRB issued 
bargaining orders. On petitions to review the bargaining orders 
and cross-petitions for enforcement, the CA 7 set aside the -
orders and refused enforcement. 
The CA 7 held that the NLRB's jurisdictional decision 
was an abuse of discretion because the parochial. schools were 
"completely religious" within any sensible meaning that could be 
assigned to the terms of the NLRB's jurisdictional standard, and 
that the NLRB's jurisdictional standard, as applied, therefore 
drew arbitrary distinctions among religious educational 
institutions. Instead of denying enforcement on that ground 
alone, and allowing the NLRB to consider whether an acceptable 
alternative jurisdictional standard would entail assertion of 
jurisdiction over the schools involved, hemilV@!', the CA 7 
accepted the NLRB's representation that it would alter its 
jurisdictional standard to assert jurisdiction over all religious 
schools, including those involved in this case. The CA 7 
tA1 L~ consequently addressed the question of the constituti~lity 
~,,.r-~· .he NLRB's certification of the unions and its orders to 
~ £~ bargain. It concluded that certification and collective 
~r- bargaining for lay teachers will result inevitably in NLRB 
of 
interference with religious faith and practice, and entanglement 
-= ~ ,-,_.,.....,~ -.. 
in church affgiLS, and that NLRB jurisdiction therefore would be 
--- :we: 
a violation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. 
4. 
2. Arguments supporting affirmance. The CA 7 opinion 
contains two independent grounds for its refusal to grant 
enforcement of the bargaining orders. I shall refer to these 
briefly afL?he jurisdictional standard argument and t~eligion 
Clauses argument. 2 
The argument that the NLRB abused its discretion in 
applying its jurisdictional standard begins with the concession 
that the NLRB has wide discretion in administering its 
self-imposed jurisdictional standards. Even though the NLRB's 
administration of its jurisdictional standards is entitled to 
2. The resps also support the CA 7 decision with the argument 
that the NLRA does not give the NLRB jurisdiction over religious 
schools. It points out that when the NLRA was originally 
enacted, Catholic schools were staffed exclusively by nuns and 
priests, and concludes that Congress never intended the NLRB to 
intrude. The broad language of the jurisdictional section of the 
NLRA, however, clearly encompasses the lay teachers at these 
schools, and the fact that a statute was written broadly enough 
to accommodate changing circumstances should not be held against 
it. Nor do I think there is much to resps' legislative history 
argument. That history shows that while Congress recognized the 
NLRB's policy of declining jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis over 
non-commercial activities of religious organizations, it never 
enacted a proposed amendment that would have made this policy 




considerable deference, however, the courts have agreed that 
under extraordinary circumstances the NLRB's misinterpretation of 
or departure from its own standards might constitute an abuse of 
discretion. ~' NLRB v. Carroll-Naslund Disposal Co., 359 F.2d 
779, 780 (9th Cir. 1966) (stating this general principle and 
citing cases) and NLRB v. Welcome-American Fertilizer Co., 443 
F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1971) (departure from NLRB's single-employer 
rule tended to cause "unjust discrimination" and "deny adequate 
notice" to employer). In such a case, the NLRB's assertion of 
jurisdiction is unlawful, even though within the NLRB's statutory 
jurisdiction. 
The NLRB misapplied its jurisdictional standard in this 
case, the argument continues, by concluding that the schools in 
question were not "completely religious." The purpose of the 
schools is to provide a theocentric education, and this religious 
~,...., -
orientation permeates the entire curriculum. This Court has -- /~ 
repeatedly recognized the pervasive religiosity of education in 
such schools in its cases striking down various forms of state 
aid to the schools. ~., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 
(1971) ("substantial religious character" of parochial schools 
would require detailed and continuing state surveillance to 
ensure secular use only of state supplements for teacher 
salaries); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 u.s. 349 (1975) (to the same 
effect). In view of these holdings, and the church's avowed 
religious purpose for its schools, the NLRB abused its discretion 
in concluding that the schools were not as completely religious 
as schools of other religions that earlier had been exempted from 
NLRB jurisdiction. 
6. 
It appears to me that the abuse of discretion attack on 
the jurisdictional standard, which finds its statutory basis in 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 u.s.c. § 706, readily becomes 
an equal protection argument. If the Catholic schools in this 
case are as "completely religious" as the schools of other sects 
over which the NLRB has declined jurisdiction under its standard, 
then the application of the standard has resulted in a denial of 
equal protection. The CA 9 adopted this equal protection 
rationale in NLRB v. Welcome-American Fertilizer Co., supra, but 
the CA 7 did not mention it in the present case and I would 
assume that the parties did not raise it below. 
Use of the jurisdictional standard may also create a 
First Amendment problem, since it may be argued that application 
of the standard requires the NLRB to assess the relative 
religiosity of curricula in various religious schools. This 
Court has often warned of the dangers of excessive state 
entanglement with religion that may result when the government 
must determine the religious content of a course of instruction. 
~.,Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra; and Levitt v. Comm. for Public 
Education, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 
u.s. 67, 70 (1953) (determination that "address" by minister of 
the Jehovah's Witnesses was not a sermon, so not allowed in 
public park, "merely an indirect way of preferring one religion 
over another"). 
7. 
The Religion Clauses argument maintains that the 
assertion of jurisdiction over these employers is a violation of 
the First Amendment, without regard to any statutory or 
constitutional problems associated with the jurisdictional 
standard. 
This argument maintains that NLRB regulation is a 
It '' violation of the Free Exercise Clause because the certification 
of the unions and the orders to bargain impinge on each Bishop's 
absolute authority over the affairs of the schools. Since each 
Bishop's authority is rooted in doctrine and reflects the 
hierarchical structure of authority in the church, any 
interference with or limitation of that authority limits the 
Bishop's free exercise of religion. This argument, as expressed 
by CA 7, also asserts that each Bishop's ability to discipline 
teachers for reasons of faith and doctrine will be reduced by the 
prospect that unfair labor practice charges will be filed by the 
teachers. 
The second thread in the Religion Clauses argument is 
that the NLRB jurisdiction asserted here will lead inevitably to 
excessive involvement of the government in the affairs of the ------
church. If a teacher claims to have been discharged because of 
pro-union activities while the Bishop claims that the discharge 
was for reasons of faith and doctrine, the NLRB will have to 
determine the actual reason for the discharge. If the employer 
places its refusal to agree to contract terms on a claimed 
shortage of funds, the NLRB will have to determine whether the 
8. 
refusal is made in good faith or is only a pretext to avoid 
further bargaining. As presented by theCA 7, this argument 
employs the language of "excessive entanglement," and appears to 
rest on the prohibition contained in the Establishment Clause. 
~·, Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (to meet 
Establishment Clause requirement, statute must, inter alia, "not 
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion"). 
But as one amicus curiae points out, the excessive involvement 
claim in this case may also be a claim that constitutional 
protections of religious institutional integrity and free 
exercise are implicated by a regulatory system that will require 
the NLRB to resolve internal church disputes. This argument 
finds its support in the numerous decisions of this Court 
refusing to interfere with decisions concerning religious 
controversies that are made by duly appointed authorities in 
hierarchical churches. See, ~' Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, 426 u.s. 696, 710-14 (1976); Kedroff v. Saint 
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 u.s. 94, 116-20 (1952). 
{}- -·~" $-I conclude in the following section that this Free ~~
 
Exercise claim is mistaken, since the NLRB need not impinge on 
religious activities in the process of regulating 
labor-management relations in these schools. That conclusion 
depends, however, on a smoothly and intelligently functioning --- --
administrative process within the NLRB. The Briefs of resps and 
the many amici curiae in this case make it clear that their 
principal fear is that the NLRB will inevitably run amok, 
... 
9. 
intruding itself into religious affairs and showing little or no 
senstivity to First Amendment concerns. While I appreciate that 
their concerns have a firm foundation in the NLRB's actions under 
its ill-considered jurisdictional standard, I am inclined at this 
point to think that it would be better to let the NLRB proceed. 
It is possible that the NLRB will succeed in walking the narrow 
course allowed to it by the Religion Clauses: if it does not, 
this Court will hear from the churches soon enough. 
?~~ 
~ 
3. Arguments recommending reversal: A vexing ~ t R"~ . ,, 
CA 7's holai'~~ 
If the NLRB's 
preliminary question is what to do about the 
regarding the NLRB's jurisdictional standard. 
application of the standard was an abuse of discretion in this 
case, then the CA 7 could have denied enforcement of the 
bargaining order without ever reaching the First Amendment 
question. This would have forced the NLRB to proceed under a new 
jursidictional standard which included all religious schools, 
thus presenting the constitutional issue squarely in a subsequent 
case, or else to forgo jurisdiction over all religiously 
associated schools. Constitutional flaws in the application of 
the jurisdictional standard also could have forestalled reaching 
the broader Religion Clauses problem. Instead the CA 7 accepted NJ.I'J. ~ 
dkl-4~ 
the NLRB's nunc ~ tunc alteration of its jurisdictional .~ L 
~~fii.C~ 
standard to include all religious schools, and went on to decide -~ 
the constitutional question. 
10. 
In their Brief on the merits, the Bishops argue that the 
NLRB violated the First Amendment in the jurisdictional inquiry 
it made under its self-imposed standard. The standard, turning 
on the distinction between "completely religious" and 
"religiously associated" schools, does invite an inquiry into the 
details of each school's religious education. The resps' Brief 
-----~ -~ 
cites examples of examinations of witnesses at the 
jurisdictional hearings that appear to be detailed inquiries 
into the proportions of religious and secular content in the 
education offered by the schools. Resps' Br., at 18-19. This 
kind of inquiry is a substantial threat to the free exercise of 
religious beliefs, since the NLRB's standards may have a coercive 
effect on religious beliefs about the scope of education 
required. It entails an excessive entanglement of government in 
the religious educational decisions of church authorities. See 
N.Y. v. Cathedral Academy, 434 u.s. 125, 133 (1977) ("[t]he 
prospect of church and state litigating in court about what does 
or does not have religious meaning touches the very core of the 
constitutional guarantee against religious establishment, and it 
cannot be dismissed by saying it will happen only once"). 
'~ ! 
~.4-~~,·~ (~~ 
~ ~::~-~ ~ ....... At-)J o-.,,... ~ 
~~ ~
There are two ways to deal with the jurisdictional 
standard problem, if the Court is to reach the Religion Clauses ... -
question.Ql9ne is to accept the NLRB's~nc pro tunc alteration 
of its standard, as the CA 7 did. Since the NLRB has the 
./' 
authority to reformulate these self-imposed standards at will, in 
the course of case-by-case adjudication, it is clear that the 
NLRB may assert jurisdiction under the altered standard in any 
new proceeding concerning these schools. Because the NLRB had 
announced its intention to assert jurisdiction over private -- ... ~ .._....-. ..., 
schools in 1970 (Cornell University, 183 NLRB 329), no problem of 
~ ~ 
notice is raised by such a nunc pro tunc alteration. If the -
Court takes this course, it should make explict both its 
condemnation of the previous jurisdictional standard and its 
acceptance of the nunc pro tunc alteration, so that the NLRB is 
clearly cut off from any future use of the old standard. 
The second possible approach to the jurisdictional 
standard problem is for the Court to reverse the CA 7 on the 
issue. This requires adopting the argument that the NLRB's 
jurisdictional standard embodies a distinction that fairly 
discriminates among religious schools in terms of the purposes of 
the NLRA. The jurisdictional standard first evolved in two cases 
in which the NLRB considered extension of its jurisdiction to 
schools devoted to teaching Jewish religion and history, and 
Hebrew language. Such schools, devoted exclusively to religious 
subjects, are necessarily adjuncts to public schools offering 
secular education; as a result, they are small in scale and labor 
'' 
12. 
disputes within them can have only the most remote effects on 
interstate commerce. Hence, the NLRB is justified in concluding 
that extension of its jurisdiction to such schools would not be 
an appropriate use of its limited resources to effectuate the 
purposes of the NLRA. Association of Hebrew Teachers, 210 
N.L.R.B. 1053 (1974); Board of Jewish Education, 210 N.L.R.B. 
1037 (1974). In contrast, parochial schools that offer a 
complete education in religious and secular subjects necessarily 
will have more employees and larger budgets than the "completely 
religious" schools, and so are likely to have a greater impact on 
interstate commerce. As for constitutional questions about the 
standard, the application of the jurisdictional standard does not 
require any assessment of relative religiosity of religiously 
associated schools; the NLRB asks only whether or not the school 
also teaches secular subjects. This limited inquiry draws no 
invidious distinctions among religious sects, since its aim is 
only the implementation of the secular purposes of the NLRA. 
/ 
There are several problems with this argument. The NLRB 
applied this standard in addition to its usual standards on 
dollar of sales or purchases in interstate commerce. The 
jurisdictional standard, then, must have some other purpose than 
sorting schools according to their size. Second, if the NLRB 
ever clearly conceived of its standard as a means of classifying 
schools by their impact on interstate commerce, the history of 
the application of the standard shows that that conception of the 
standard was soon lost. The jurisdictional standard appears to 
13. 
have become confused with First Amendments limitations on NLRB 
authority, see Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 
N.L.R.B. 249 (1975), and Cardinal T. Manning, Roman Catholic 
Archbishop, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976). This confusion about the 
purpose of the standard inevitably led to the kind of detailed -
inquiry in~~ious c~n_!ent of the education offered bJ the 
schools that took place here. Finally, if the standard was not 
used to discriminate among schools simply on the basis of their 
size and impact on interstate commerce, then I think there is 
some merit to the equal protection claim of those religious 
schools that were subjected to regulation. 
The CA 7's treatment of the Religion Clauses argument is 
based on an attractive rhetorical point-- if Catholic parochial 
~ _,.,.... 
schools are too religious to receive state aid, then they must 
also be too religious to allow government regulation of their 
labor affairs. But if this Court's decisions regarding the 
Religion Clauses show anything, it is that such sweeping 
generalizations have been of little aid in defining the 
separation of church and state required by the Constitution. 
Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). It is clear that 
the wall-of-separation metaphor has proved inadequate to the 
realities of a world in which secular and sectarian institutions 
necessarily interact with one another. In the very case in which 
Justice Black stated the metaphor as a guiding principle, the 
Court approved state payment of bus fares for parochial school 
students. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
14. 
The Court has since recognized that the line of separation is a 
blurred, indistinct, variable barrier depending on all the 
circumstances of a particular relationship. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 u.s. 602, 614 (1971). 
( 
Since complete separation is impossible, careful 
evalu~ .. e-ach ~~:_d interaction. between church and state, 
in terms of the purposes of the Religion Clauses, is essential. 
~~...._,w~ ........ ,....., 
Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952). In Walz v. Tax 
Comm'r, supra, the Court stated that "the basic purpose of [the 
Religion Clausesl ... is to insure that no religion be sponsored 
or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited." 397 u.s. at 
669. Careful analysis under these general principles has led to 
the approval of many kinds of government action that both aid and 
~ .........__.... ........ ....,.__. ............. ..... 
impinge on Catholic parochial schools. ~.,property tax 
exemptions (Walz v. Tax Comm'r, supra); bus fares for parochial 
school students (Everson v. Board of Education, supra); loan of 
secular, publicly owned textbooks to private school students 
(Board of Education v. Allen, 392 u.s. 236 (1968)); and the 
oft-cited examples of police and fire protection, health and 
safety regulations, and compulsory attendance laws. 
The touchstone of a free exercise of religion claim ~ / 
government coercion in matters of religious faith or practice. J 
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). 
In this case, I see no possibility of such coercion of the 
Bishops or of the church hierarchy in general, either under the 
present bargaining orders or in the hypothetical unfair labor 
~· ~~-15.,. 
....... ~IOC.C..~ ~--... ~~ 
~~~.---~-## .. ~ ~ 
practice proceedings conjured up by theCA 7. The act of~ 
\
collective bargaining is not itself contrary to the teach~·;-~~ 
t~a~-ch:~. -~omp:re Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 u.s. 205 - ~· 
(1972) (compliance with compulsory school attendance law would 
have violated sincerely held religious beliefs of Amish people; 
held enforcement of attendance law would be a violation of Free 
Exercise of Religion Clause). The certification of a union 
representing lay teachers and the order to the Bishop to bargain 
with the union do not reduce the Bishop's absolute authority over 
the religious life of the school, since his control over the 
religious content of instruction and qualifications of teachers 
is unaltered. It will be up to the Bishop to insist, in 
bargaining with the union, that those religious prerogatives must 
be respected and preserved completely in any contract; in no 
event will the Bi shop be required to agree to a dimunition of his 
authority in favor of the union. Assertion of NLRB jurisdiction, 
by way of the union certifications and orders to bargain, is 
therefore not unlike health, safety, and fire, and attendance 
regulations imposed on churches and church schools--intrusions 
for limited secular purposes, and having no unconstitutional 
effect on the exercise of religious faith and principle. 
The bargaining orders themselves do not raise any 
questions about the constitutional ljmits on subsequent unfair 
labor practice proceedings arising out of the bargaining process 
or the discharge of teachers for heretical teaching. Any 
constitutional problems that may arise during the course of 
bargaining or the life of the collective bargaining agreement may ----
be resolved at that time. 3 For the present, it is sufficient 
to support NLRB jurisdiction that certification of the unions and 
-= c:.-
bargaining on at least some topics (wages, hours, vacations, and 
pensions) do not interfere with the free exercise of religious 
beliefs by the Bishops or the church hierarchy in general. 
TheCA 7, however, concentrated its attention on the 
prospect that such unfair labor practice proceedings would result 
inevitably in future NLRB interference with religious faith and td/1 7~ 
.,.. ,, tlb. ..... ~ 
practice. Even if the CA 7 acted properly in assessing the I ! ~ 
~,...c.-p..u.,. 
constitutionality of future unfair labor practice proceedings J&• ••"~ 
before the NLRB, it arrived at the wrong conclusion. I think.it~~~ 
is highly unlikely that in future unfair labor practice IA1.i~.J-4.,,.J... 
proceedings related to bargaining or the discharge of teachers, 
the Bishops will be forced into actions inconsistent with their 
faith and doctrine. To borrow the CA 7's example, suppose a 
teacher who one day makes a strong pro-union address, then the 
3. ~, resps suggest that the Bishop's authority to close a 
school in order to divert the money to another religious mission 
might be diminished by assertion of NLRB jurisdiction. I think 
this is wrong. See NLRB v. Jackson Farmers, Inc., 457 F.2d 516 
(lOth Cir. 1972) (collecting cases on analogous problem of 
contracting out work formerly done by union employees). In any 
event, the First Amenament limits on NLRB authority to interfere 
with the Bishop's authority in such matters may be resolved when 
the issue arises. 
17. 
next day teaches his history class an approving lesson about the 
crusade for legalization of birth control in this country. The 
Bishop discharges the teacher, who files an unfair labor practice 
charge. 
The NLRB's investigation of the charge will focus on the 
motive of the Bishop in discharging the teacher, and not the 
truth or validity of the church's doctrines on birth control. To 
support his discharge of the teacher, the Bishop would have to 
show that the discharge was motivated by doctrinal considerations 
and the need to protect against heretical teaching. (Similarly 
in the bargaining process itself, the Bishop's statement of 
constraints imposed on his bargaining latitude by principles of 
faith and doctrine will be final and authoritative.) In 
demonstrating his motivation, he might have to show that in other 
situations involving the same heresy but no union activity, the 
heretic was also discharged; where the same heresy had never 
before occurred, the Bishop might be required to show that the 
alleged doctrinal basis for the discharge was in fact a sincerely 
held tenet of his religious faith. In short, he would have to;'~ 
show that anti-union animus had no place in his decision. 
The inquiry need never go further than determining 
whether the proffered doctrines are in fact sincerely held 
beliefs or are only pretexts to avoid legitimate obligations. 
The inquiry into the sincerity of beliefs is not a First 
Amendment violation, and is often necessary to ensure adequate 
protection of Free Exercise rights. See, ~, Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, supra. As long as the Bishop could demonstrate the basis 
18. 
in faith and doctrine for the discharge of the teacher as a 
heretic, the teacher would have no complaint under the NLRA. 
It will not be open to the teacher to argue that church doctrine 
is in fact different, and to have the NLRB determine the "true" 
doctrine. By hypothesis, if the Bishop could not demonstrate a 
basis for the discharge in the doctrine and consistent practice 
of the church, then the teaching in question would not have been 
a heresy and ordering the rehiring of the teacher does not force 
the Bishop to take an action contrary to doctrine and faith. 4 
This limite~ inquiry does not threaten the Bishop's right of free 
exercise, and the necessity of the inquiry is not sufficient to 
immunize the Bishop from all regulation. Cf. Associated Press v. 
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (AP had right to discharge employee for 
violation of AP's editorial policies but not for unj.on activity, 
and could not claim immunity from NLRA on account of First 
Amendment protections of the press) . 
If the NLRB does allow itself to become a forum for the 
resolution of doctrinal disputes properly reserved for the 
ecclesiastical courts, Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 
supra, then that will be time enough for the Bishop to raise Free 
Exercise Clause objections. 
4. ~' Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 222 N.L.R.B. No. 
156 (1976), enf. denied on relevant point, 549 F.2d 873, 882 (2d 
Cir. 1977) (NLRB inquiry into possible anti-union movitation for 
discharge of a teacher) . 
~ n.4 ~.~.~~ . . . ,~..;_ . 
';I~~~ -
The possibility that 
~~,.~.41~~ 
u~~ir-l~o; practice proceedings 
will be frequent does not strike me as a free 
exercise-entanglement problem. If a church repeatedly violated ~ 
health and fire regulations, repeated citations and fines would ~ 
A14o.4~ 
not present a constitutional problem. ~ 
It is also clear in this case that the NLRB has not 
singled out one church, or even churches in general, for -
regulation, but has extended its jurisdiction to all private 
schools except those too small to have an appreciable effect on 
--= ...... 
interstate commerce. See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, supra (tax 
exemption extended to all property used for religious, 
educational, or charitable purposes). I regard this as 
additional evidence that NLRB enforcement of the statute in this 
case has a secular purpose, and is not intended to burden or 
restrict the exercise of religious beliefs . 
........ 
~~~ The most significant opportunity presented by this case 
~ ~~~is the chance to clarify the analytic distinction between the 
~~J· ~ree Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. The standard 
~.,...,~ -
~~ •• ~~r assessing Establishment Clause claims that has been adopted 
~~~~ lately by the Court has obscured that distinction, resulting in 
~CA - confusions apparent in the argument and decision of this case 
~below. 
~~The Court recently stated its Establishment Clause 
- standard in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977). In order 
to pass muster under the Establishment Clause, "a statute must 
have a secular legislative purpose, must have a principal or 
.tu. 
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and 
must not foster an excessive government entanglement with 
religion." There are two troublesome aspects to this standard: ~ . 
~ 
(1) in the second branch of the standard, the indication that a bJ~ 
governmental action with the primary effect of inhibiting ~~1~.S· 
~ '2..S(;, 
religion is an Establishment Clause violation; and (2) in the 
third branch of the standard, the indication that any excessive 
entanglement of government with religion is an Establishment 
Clause problem. While it is the purpose of the Religion Clauses 
"to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none 
commanded, and none inhibited," Walz v. Tax Comm'r, supra, only 
part of that purpose is committed to the Establishment Clause. 
It \\ 
The Establishment Clause is meant to prevent government 
aid to religion in gaining and keeping adherents. Abington 
School Dist. v. Schempp, supra, 374 U.S. at 228 (Douglas, J., 
cone.). The "establishment" of a religion "connotes sponsorship, 
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in 
religious activities." Walz v. Tax Comm'r, supra, 397 U.S. at 
668. Establishment clause problems arise when state aid to 
religion or religious institutions has the purpose or primary 
effect of encouraging religion, or brings with it the possibility 
of excessive government entanglement in the course of 
administration of the aid. ~, McCollum v. Board of Education, 
333 U.S. 203 (1948), and Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 
(1952) (released time programs in public schools); Engel v. 




public schools): Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 
(1968) (statute requiring public school teachers to teach only 
Biblical explanation of creation of man): Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 ( 1971) (public funds used to supplement teacher salaries 
in private sectarian schools): and Hunt v. McNair, 413 u.s. 744 
(1973) (funds for construction of buildings by sectarian 
college). 
Where no state aid to religion is involved, but only 
regulation impinging on religious activity or institutions, we 
will keep the categories of First Amendment analysis clearer and 
more precise if we treat the proposed regulation as a Free 
Exercise problem only. The threat in a case such as the present 
one, involving only regulation, is not one of sponsorship and 
fostering of religion in general or of a particular sect, but of 
interference with religious doctrine and faith in the course of 
regulation. 5 A useful example is Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 
involving state compulsory school attendance laws and treated by 
this Court as a Free Exercise problem. This is also the type of 
question raised 
5. It is possible to argue that by imposing regulation on 
one religion, the government aids other religions, so that the 
regulation becomes a law "respecting an establishment of 
religion." But if the regulation has a secular purpose and 
involves no active governmental aid or sponsorship of the 
unregulated religions, then the problem can be dealt with more 
clearly by treating it as a Free Exercise question only, rather 
than by adopting this backhanded Establishment Clause theory. 
22. 
when the courts are asked to interfere in the internal governance 
of churches. See, ~, Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. at 710-14: and Kedroff v. Saint 
Nicholas Cathedral, supra, 344 u.s. at 116-20. Though the 
problem of regulation unrelated to aid may be characterized as 
one of "entanglement" of government in religious affairs, it is 
not an Establishment Clause problem at all. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
supra, 403 U.S. at 634 (Douglas, J., cone.). To the extent that 
the Establishment Clause standard lately adopted by the Court 
appears to include all instances of "entanglement," it confuses 
rather than facilitates analysis. 
The rule that a governmental action with a primary 
1\ ,, 
effect that inhibits religion is an Establishment Clause 
violation also errs in defining the ambit of the Establishment 
Clause. I think this is apparent from a close examination of 
~ this Court's Establishment Clause cases. All of these cases have 
~;~)dealt wi~h statutes that had the effect (primary or secondary) of 
~ te.ncourag1ng religion. In fact, in several cases the 
~ Establishment Clause standard has been stated only in terms of 
~""aid to or advancement of religion. ~, Levitt v. Comm. for 
't a,.,r- Pulbic Education, 413 u.s. 472, 481 (1973) ("The essential inquiry 
!..L~ ~ in each case .•. is whether the challenged state aid has the 
~ primary purpose or effect of advancing religion or religious 
~ucation or whether it leads to excessive entanglement by the 
~ State in the affairs of the religious institution"): cf. Hunt v. 
McNair, 413 u.s. 734, 743 (1973) (after quoting "advances nor 
23. 
inhibits" standard, focused Establishment Clause inquiry entirely 
on question of when aid may be thought to have "primary effect of 
advancing religion"). Your own opinion 
Education v~Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 
in Comm. for Public 
. .( 
(1973), 1s the ony clear . .. 
recent attribution of the "or inhibits religion" standard to the 
Free Exercise Clause. 
"[T]his Court has repeatedly recognized that tension 
inevitably exists between the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses [citing cases] As a result 
of this tension, our cases require the State to maintain 
an attitude of 'neutrality,' neither 'advancing' nor 
'inhibiting' religion." 
Since this case involves no governmental aid to 
t L '' religion, it should be treated as a Free Exercise case and not as 
--- ==-
an Establishment Clause case. The foregoing clarification of the 
doctrine relating these two clauses will facilitate this approach 
and provide more useful guidance in future litigation. 
If the accepted Establishment Clause standard is applied 
to this case, I think it works out as follows. There can be no 
doubt that the NLRA has a secular legislative purpose, the 
minimization of disruptions of interstate commerce through the 
fostering of peaceful labor-management relations. The difficulty 
arises in applying the effect and entanglement criteria. 
The primary effect of application of the NLRA to the 
Catholic schools is the fostering of collective bargaining 
between the religious authorities of the schools and the lay 
teachers. As the foregoing discussion has stressed, nothing 
about the process of collective bargaining directly encourages or 
24. 
inhibits religion. No public funds are used to support any of 
the activities of the church. Unionization may make it more 
expensive to run schools that are unionized after assertion of 
NLRB jurisdiction, but this is the same kind of incidental effect 
that accompanies health, safety, and fire regulations. The fact 
that the schools of some religions may be subjected to NLRB 
jurisdiction and others not also seems to me an incidental effect 
of a statute with a primarily secular effect. See McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing law with secular 
purpose, and differential impact on those who worshipped on the 
Sabbath, did not amount to an Establishment Clause violation). 
The question of entanglement is one of degree. The 
cases in which the Court has found a significant threat of 
excessive entanglement have involved situations in which the 
state would have been required to make detailed assessments of 
the religiosity of classroom materials and teaching in order to 
ensure that state aid was not used for sectarian education. In 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, and Earley v. DiCenso, 403 u.s. 602, 
618-19 (1971), to administer programs of supplements to teacher 
salaries in private schools, the state would have been required 
to monitor teaching constantly and carefully to ensure secular 
use only of the state funds. In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 
369-70 (1975), and Wollman v. Wallace, supra, ensuring secular 
use of publicly supplied "auxiliary services" (remedial and 
accelerated instruction, guidance counseling, speech and hearing 
25. 
services provided in the sectarian schools, and field trips) 
would have required excessive entanglement between church and 
state. Similarly in Levjtt v. Comm. for Public Education, supra 
the Court concluded that there was no means of ensuring secular 
use of public funds meant to pay for tests prepared by teachers 
in sectarian schools. 
In contrast, where government aid can be confined to 
secular uses without extensive government intrusion into the 
day-to-day operations of religious schools, the Court has found 
no threat of entanglement. ~, Board of Education v. 
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (secular content of textbooks could be 
ascertained): Everson v. Board of Education, supra (bus 
transportation for parochial school students): Hunt v. McNair, 
supra (aid for construction of buildings by sectarian college): 
and the oft-cited examples of police and fire protection. 
Regulation of labor relations under the NLRA will not 
\require review of the religious activities of the Bishops. If a 
teacher is discharged for heresy, the only question will be 
whether anti-union motives in fact precipitated the discharge. 
It will not be open to the teacher to dispute the Bishop's 
statement of the requirements of faith and doctrine. The only 
other involvement of the NLRB, and the only question actually 
raised by the NLRB's petition for enforcement of its bargaining 
order, will be the monitoring of bargaining between the employers 
and the unions to ensure good faith bargaining, and none of the 
parties has suggested a way in which this supervision might 
~o. 
entangle the government in the religious affairs of the church. 
4. Conclusion. I recommend accepting the NLRB's 
retroactive alteration of its jurisdictional standard rather tha 
reversing theCA 7's holding that the NLRB's assertion of 
jurisdiction under the standard was unlawful. On the First 
Amendment question, I recommend reversing the CA 7 on the ground 
that the certification of the unions and the orders to bargain do 
not interfere with anyone's free exercise of religion. If it is 
necessary to also consider likely future events in the course of 
NLRB regulation, then I also recommend concluding that the 
prospects of interference with free exercise of religion are 
remote enough to be left future litigation and do not require 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 77-752, Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB 
The SG has filed a Reply Brief. The only arguments 
deserving special note concern the NLRB's jurisdictional 
standard for discriminating between "completely religious" 
and "religiously associated" schools. 
The SG contends that the jurisdictional standard is 
not based on any notion that the First Amendment prohibits 
NLRB jurisdiction over "completely religious" schools. Rather, 
the Nlrb's self-imposed jurisdictional limitation is meant, 
like the other jurisdictional limits it observes, to effectuate 
the policy of the Act by husbanding its limited regulatory 
resources. 
The SG also contends that application of the standard 
does not require any inquiry into the nature or content of 
- -- -----· - -------~- -  -~------------------
religious instruction in the schools. '~he Board declines 
. _ _..___..,_____..,.____~ 
jurisdiction only over education institutions that essentially 
limit themselves to providing supplementary religious instructions 
during after school hours and that do not seek to provide 
an alternative to public school •. education or to satisfy state 
compulsory education requirements. The Board asserts 
jurisdiction over all other schools whose gross revenue meets 
the $1 million monetary standard, regardless of whether such 
schools are religiously affiliated or the education provided 
by the schools is offered with a religious orientation." 
(r,P· 9-/.d 
I discussed some of these points in my Bench Memorandu~ 
It is not clear from the way in which the jurisdictional 
standard has been applied that the NLRB has restricted itself 
to the kind of secular inquiry that the SG describes, though 
it is clearly possible to apply the standard on the basis of 
such a limited inquiry. Th~em, which the SG does 
not resolve, is that religious schools that do not attempt to 
provide a complete education, but that have operating budgets 
satisfying the NLRB's usual measure for jurisdictional impact 
on interstate commerce, are exempted from NLRB jurisdiction. 
l 
This is plainly arbitrary, and the SG has offered no reason to 
explain why it is not. Further, to the extent that the distinction 
thus drawn is highly correl ated with the particular religious 
.......... 
affiliations of the schools involved, it may raise Establishment 
Clause problems. On the whole, I think that the Court would ------
do well to disapprove this standard, and force the NLRB back --· ~-"-----...... __________ ~_
to the use of clearly articulated and easily ascertainable 
criteria such as size of work force and annual operating budget. 
)V" 
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N atioual Labor Rela.tions Board. 
Petitioner, 
v. 
The Catholic Bishop of 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit. 
(~.yW~S') 
Chicago et al. 
[January -, 1979] 
/;~- · .-.. ~~. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opmwn 
~ v u.rvvvr Court, 
This case arises out of the ~ational Labor Relations Board's 
exercise of JUrisdiction over lay faculty members at two 
groups of Catholic high schools. We gran ted certiorari to 
consider two questions. (a) Whether teachers in schools 
operated by a church to teach both religious and secular 
subJects are within the Jurisdiction granted by the National 
Labor Relations Act; and (b) If the Act authorizes such 
jurisdiction, does its exercise violate the guarantees of the 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment? 434 U. S. 1061 
( 1978), 
I 
Une group of schools 1s operated by the Catholic Bishop of 
Chicago, a corporation sole; the other group is operated by 
tho Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc. The group 
operated by the Catholic Bishop of Chicago consists of two 
schools, Quigley North aud Quigley South.1 Those schools 
are termed "mi11or semiJJaries" because of their role m 
ed ncatmg lugh school students who may become priests. 
'The Ca.thohc Bi:;hop operates other :schools in the Clurago area, but 
they were not involved m the proceedings before the Board. 
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At one time. only students who manifested a positive and 
confirmed desire to be priests were admitted to the Quigley 
schools. In 1970 the requirement was changed so that stu-
dents admitted to these schools need not show a definite 
inclination toward the priesthood. Now the students need 
only be recommended by their parish priest as having a 
potential for the priesthood or for Christian leadership. The 
schools continue to provide special religious instruction not 
offered in other Catholic secondary schools. The Quigley 
schools also offer essentially the same college preparatory 
curnculum as public secondary schools. Their students par-
ticipate in a variety of extracurricular activities which include 
secular as well as religious events. The schools are recog-
nized by the State and accredited by a regional educational 
organization.2 
The Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., has five high 
schools.8 Unlike the Quigley schools. the special recom-
mendatwn of a priest IS not a prerequisite for admission. 
Like the Quigley schools, however, these high schools seek to 
provide a traditional secular education but oriented to the 
tenets of the Roman Catholic faith; religious training is also 
mandatory. These schools are similarly certified by the State.4 
~ J{p(•ord, at :m:~ . A:> explained to tht• Board'o; Hearing Officer, in Illinois 
the term ''approval" is d1~tmct from " recognition.'' Before a ~chool may 
opC'ratc, It mu~t be approved by the State's Department of Education. 
Approval ts given when a school mret~ the minimal requirements under 
lltatc Jaw, ~uch as for compulsory attendance; approval doel:' not require 
any rvaluat10n of the :;chool's program. Recognition, which is not requin"d 
to U}H'nttl', Js given only after the ::~chool ha;; pa~::;ed the State's evaluation. 
'The Diocese also has 47 elementary schools. They were not involved 
in the procredings before the Board. 
'Rec·ord at. 77. As explained to the Board's Hearing Officer, "certifica-
tiOn" by the State of Indiana 1::1 roughly equivalent to " recognition" hy 
the State of IllinOis . Both are voluntary procedures which involve some 
evaluation by the state educatwnal authorities. See Ind. Code § 20-10.1-
~- l 2. 
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In 1974 and 1975 separate representation petitions were 
filed with the Board by interested union organizations for 
both the quigley and the Fort Wayne-South Bend schools; 
representation was sought only for lay teachers." The schools 
challenged the assertion of jurisdiction on two grounds: 
(a) that they do not fall within the Board's discretionary 
jurisdictional criteria; and (b) that the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment preclude the Board's jurisdiction. The 
Board rejected the jurisdictional arguments on the basis of 
its decision in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 
N. L . .R. B. 249 (1975). There the Board explained that its 
policy was to decline jurisdiction over religiously sponsored 
organizations "only when they are completely religious, not 
just religiously associated." I d., at 250. Because neither 
group of schools was found to fall within the Board's "com-
pletely religious" category, the Board ordered elections. 'The 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, A Corporation Sol<!, 220 N. L. R. B. 
359 (1975) .6 
ln the Board-supervised election at the Quigley schools, the 
Quigley Education Alliance, a union affiliated with the Illinois 
Education Association, prevailed and was certified as the 
exclusive bargaining representative for 46 lay teachers. In 
the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, the Community 
Alliance for Tea.chers of Catholic High Schools, a similar 
union organization, prevailed and was certified as the repre-
sentative for the approximately 180 lay teachers. Notwith-
standing the Board's order, the schools declined to recognize 
~ The certification and order cover only "all full-time and regular 
part-tnne lay teachers, including physical education teachers ... ; exclud-
ing !1Pctor::;, procurators, dPan of studies, business manager, director of 
~tudent activities, direct.or of formation, director of counseling services, 
office clencal employPes, maintenance employees, cafeteria workers, watch·· 
men, librarians, nurses, all religwus faculty, and all guards and supervisors 
a~ drfined in the Act, . . ~~ 
6 The decisiOn of the Hegional Director in Diocese of Fort Wayne-South 
Bendl Inc ,, io. not repurtrd 
'• 
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the unions or to bargain. The unions filed unfair labor 
practice complaints with the Board under ~§ 8 (a) (1) and (5) 
of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. ~§ 158 (a) 
(1) and (5). The schools opposed the General Counsel's 
motion for summary judgment, again challenging the Board's 
exercise of jurisdictiou over religious schools on both statutory 
and constitutional grounds. 
The Board reviewed the record of previous proceedings and 
concluded that all of the arguments had been raised or could 
have been raised in those earlier proceedings. Since the 
arguments had been rejected previously, the Board granted 
summary judgmeut, holding that it had properly exercised its 
statutory discretion iu asserting jurisdiction over these schools.7 
The Board concluded that the schools had violated the Act 
and ordered that they cease their unfair labor practices and 
that they bargain collectively with the unions. 'l'he Catholic 
Bishop of Chicago, A Corporation Sole, 224 N. L. R. B. 
1221 (1976); Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 224 
N. L. R. B. 1226 (1976) . 
II 
The schools challenged the Board's orders in petitions to 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. That court 
denied enforcement of the Board's orders. Catholic Bishop 
7 The Board relied on its reasoning in Cardinal Ti·mothy Manning, 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of the At·chdiocese of Los Angeles, A Corpo-
ration Sole, 22:3 N. L. R. B. 1218, 1218 (1976): "We also do not agree 
that the schools are r£'ligious institutions intimat£'1y involved with the 
Catholic Church. It hn,; hrrc!ofom b('(.'n the Board's policy to decline 
jurisdiction ovf'r institutions only whf'n they are completely religious, not 
just religiously associated. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 
Archdwcesan High Schools, 216 N. L. R. B. 249 (1975) . The schools 
perform in part the :,;rcular function of educating childrf'n, and in part 
concern themselves with l't>ligious instrnction. Therefore, we will not 
decline to asSPrt junsdiction over these schools on such a. basis. Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, Archdio('esan lligh Schools, supra.'~ 
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of Chicago, A Corporat'ion Sole v. NLRB, 559 F. 2d 1112 
(CA7 1977).8 The court considered the Board's actions in 
relation to its discretion in choosing to extend its jurisdiction 
only to religiously affiliated schools that were not "completely 
religious." It concluded that the Board had not properly 1 
exercised its discretion, because the Board's distinction between 
"completely religious" and "merely religiously associated" 
faileci to provide a workable guide for the exercise of 
discreti();: - - -
"We find the standard itself to be a simplistic black or 
white, purported rule containing no borderline demarca-
tion of where 'completely religious' takes over or, on the 
other hand, ceases. In our opinion the dichotomous 'com-
pletely religious-merely religiously associated' standard 
provides no workable guide to the exercise of discretion. 
The determination that an institution is so completely a 
religious entity as to exclude any viable secular com-
ponents obviously implicates very sensitive questions of 
faith and tradition. See, e. g., [Wisconsin v.j Yoder, ... , 
406 U.S. 205 [(1972)] ." 559F. 2d, at 1118. 
The Com·t of Appeals recogniz:ed that the rejection of the 
Board's policy as to church-operated schools meant that the 
Board would extend its jurisdiction to aU church-operated 
schools. The court therefore turned to the question of whether 
the Board could exercise that jurisdiction, consistent with 
constitutioual limitations. It concluded that both the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment foreclosed the Board's jurisdiction. It reasoned 
that from the initial act of certifying a union as the bargain-
iug agent for lay teachers the Board's action would impinge 
8 Cf. Caulfield v. Hirsch, 410 F. Supp. 618 (ED Pa. 1977) (Pnjoining 
Board from assprting ,iuri;;diction over eiPmentary schools in Archdiocese 
of Ph1ladrlphia) . This ra:-;e is presently undN review by the Court of 
Appeals for the Th1rd Circuit. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiora.ri, at 
A7o, Cau.ljield V. l-li1·8rh,. No . n - 1411, rert. denied, 4:{6 u . S. 957 (1978) . 
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upon the freedom of church authorities to sha.pe and direct 
teaching in accord with the requirements of their religion. It 
analyzed the Board 's action in this way : 
"At some poiut, factual inquiry by courts or agencies 
into such matters I separating secular from religious train-
mg] would almost necessarily raise First Amendment 
problems. If history den10nstrates, as it does, that Roman 
Catholics founded an alternative school system for essen-
tially religious reasons and continued to maintain them as 
an 'integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic 
Church, ' Lemon I v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602], 616 
r ( 1971) l' courts and agencies would be hard pressed t0 
take official or judicial notice that these purposes were 
undermined or eviscerated by the determination to offer 
such secular subjects as mathematics, physics, chemistry, 
aud English literature." 559 F. 2d, at 1118. 
The court distinguished local regulations which required 
fire inspections or state laws mandating attendance, reasoning 
that they did not "have the clear inhibiting potential upon 
the relationship between teachers and employers with which 
the present Board order is directly concerned." Ibid. The 
court held that interference with management prerogatives, 
found acceptable in an ordinary commercial setting, was not 
acceptable in an area protected by the First Amendment. 
"The real difficulty is found in the chilling aspect that the 
req uircment of bargaining will impose on the exercise of the 
bishops' control of the religious mission of the schools." Id., 
at 1124. 
Ill 
The Board's assertion of Jurisdiction over private schools is, 
as we noted earlier, a relatively recent development. Indeed, 
m 1951 the Board indicated that it would not exercise juris-
diction over nonprofit, educational institutions because to do 
so would not effectuate the purposes of the Act. The Trustees: 
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of Columbia University in the City of New York, 97 
N. L. R. B. 424 (1951). In 1970, however, the Board pointed 
to what it saw as au increased involvement in commerce by 
educational institutions and concluded that this required a 
different positioH 011 j'urisdictiou. In Cornell University, 183 
N. L. R. B. 329 (1970), the Board overruled its Columbia 
University decision. Cornell University was followed by the 
assertion of jurisdiction over non profit, private secondary 
schools. Shattuck School, 189 N. L. R. B. 886 (1971). See 
also Judscn School, 209 N. L. R. B. 677 ( 1974). The Board 
now assert~ .. J~isdiction over all private. nonprofit, educa-
tional institu1ions wiTh gross annual revenues tfiat meet its 
j unsdlCtwual requirements whether they are secular or reli-
gious. 29 CFR ~ 103.1 ( 1977). See, e. g., Academia San 
Jorge, 234 N. L. R. B. No. 183 (1978) (advisory opinion 
stating that Board would not assert jurisdiction over Catholic 
educational institution which did not meet jurisdictional 
sta11dards); The Windsor School, Inc., 199 N. L. R. B. 457, 200 
N. L. R. B. 991 (1972) (declining jurisdiction where private, 
proprietary school did not rneet JUrisdictional amounts). 
That broad assertion of jurisdiction has not gone unchal-
lenged. But the Board has rejected the contentiou that the· 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment bar the extension 
of its JUrisdiction to church-operated schools. Where the· 
Board has declined to exercise jurisdiction, it has done so only 
on the grounds of the employer's minimal impact on com-
merce. Thus, iu Association of Hebrew Teachers of M '3tro-
pol~tan Detroit, 210 N. L. R. B. 1053 ( 1974). the Board did 
110t assert J urisdictiou over the Association which offered 
courses in Jewish culture in after-school classes. a nursery 
school. and at a college. The Board termed the Association 
a11 "' isolated instance of [an] atypica1 employer.'' !d., at 
10.5~- 1059. lt explained that "[w]hether an employer falls 
within a given 'class' of enterprise depends upon those of its 
activiti<'s which are predominant and give the employing 
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activity its character. . . . [T]he fact that an employer's 
activity ... is dedicated to a sectarian religious purpose is 
not a sufficient reason for the Board to refrain from asserting 
jurisdiction." !d., at 1058. Cf. Board of Jewish Education 
of Greater Washington, D. C., 210 N. L. R. B. 1037 (1974). 
In the same year the Board asserted jurisdictiou over an 
association chartered by the State of New York to operate 
diocesan high schools. Henry M. Hald High School Associa-
tion, 213 N. L. R. B. 415 (1974). It rejected the argument 
that its assertion of .i urisdiction would produce excessive 
governmental entanglement with religion. In the Board's 
view, the Association had chosen to entangle itself with the 
secular world when it decided to hire lay teachers. I d., at 
418 n. 7.u 
When it ordered an election for the lay professional em-
ployees at five parochial high schools in Baltimore in 1975, 
the Board reiterated its belief that exercise of its jurisdiction 
is not contra.ry to the First Amendment: 
61 
• •• the Board's policy in the past has been to decline 
·jurisdiction over similar institutions only when they are 
completely religious, not just religiously associated, and 
the Archdiocese concedes that instruction is Hot limited 
to religious subjects. That the Archdiocese seeks to 
provide an education based on Christiall principles does 
not lead to a contrary conclusion. Most religiously asso-
Ciated institutions seek to operate in conformity with 
their religious tenets.' ' Rornan Catholic Archdiocese of 
Baltimore, 216 N. L. R. B. 249, 250 (1975). 
'The Board rejected the First Amendment claims in Cardinal 
Timothy Manning, Rorna:n Catholic Archbishop of the Arch-
diocese of Los Angeles, A eorporation Sole, 223 N. L. R. B. 
9 The Board went on to explain lhat the rights guaranteed by § 7 of the 
Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, were "a part of our national heritage established 
by Congress, [and] were a legitimate ·cxerci~c of Congress' constitutionaT 
}>OWPI'.'' 2 Ja N L R B., at 418 11 7. 
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1218, 1218 (1976): "Regulation of labor relations does not 
vwlate the First Amendment when it involves a minimal 
intrusion on religious conduct ami is necessary to obtain that 
[the Act's] objective." (Emphasis added.) 
) 
The ~oard thus reco£22 izes that its assertion of jurisdiction 
over teachers in religious schools constitutes some de ee of 
intrusion into the administration of the a a1rs of church~ 
operated schools. Implicit in the Board's distinction between 
schools that are "completely religious'' and those "religiously 
associated' ' is also an acknowledgement of some degree of 
entanglement. Because that distinction was measured by a 
school's involvement with commerce. however, and not by its 
religious association, it is clear that the Board never envis~ 
ioned any sort of religious litmus test for determining when to 
assert jurisdiction. Nevertheless. by expressing its traditionaJ 
jurisdictional standards in First Amendment terms, the Board 
has plainly recognized that intrusion into this area could run 
afoul of the Religion Clauses and hence preclude jurisdiction 
on constitutional grounds. 
IV 
That there are constitutional limitations on the Board's 
actions has been repeatedly recognized by this Court even 
while acknowledging the broad scope of the grant of .iurisdic~ 
tion. In one of the early Board cases to reach this Court we 
said that the "Act ou its face ... evidences the intention of 
Congress to exercise whatever power is constitutionally given 
to It to regulate commerce.' ' NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 
601, 607 (1939) (emphasis added). Later, the Court sum~ 
marized intervening decisions when it wrote: 
"This Court has consistently declared that in passing the 
)iational Labor Relations Act. Congress intended to and 
did vest in the Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth 
constitutwnally permissible under the Commerce Clause." 
N LRB v. Reliance Fuel Corporation, 371 U. S. 224, 220. 
(1963) (emphasis a.lteredL 
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The First Amendment, on its face, of course, is a limitation 
on the power of Congress. Thus, if we were to conclude that 
the Act granted the challenged jurisdiction over these teach-
ers we would be required to decide whether that was "consti-
tutionally permissible" under the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment. 
Although the respondents press their claims under the 
Religion Clauses. the question we consider first is whether 
Congress intended the Board to have jurisdiction over teach-
ers iu chUI'ch-o})Crated schools. In a number of cases the 
Court has heeded the essence of Chief Justice Marshall's 
admonition in The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch (6 U. S.) 64, 
118 (1804), by holding that an Act of Congress ought not 
be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible 
construction remains available. Moreover, the Court has 
followed this policy in the interpretation of the Act now 
before us and related statutes. 
In International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 
U. S. 740 (1961), for example, the Court considered claims 
that serious First Amendment questions would arise if the 
Railway Labor Act were construed to allow compulsory union 
dues to bP used to support political candidates or causes not 
approved by some members. The Court echoed Chief Justice 
Marshall: "Federal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid 
serious doubt of their constitutionality. ' ' ld., at 749. Ac-
cordingly the Court looked first to the Act itself to determine 
whether it could be read so as to avoid reaching the constitu-
tional question. After examining the legislative history of 
the Act the Court construed the Act so as to avoid the First 
Amendment questions. I d., at 770. 
Similarly in McCulloch v. Sociedad N acional de M arineros 
de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), the Court declined to read 
the National Labor Relations Act so as to give rise to a 
serious question of separation of powers which in turn would 
have implicated sensitive issues of the exclusive authority of 
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the Executive over relations with foreign nations. The inter-
natioual implications of the case led the Court to describe it 
as involving "public questions particularly high in the scale 
of our national interest." I d., at 17. Because of those ques-
tions the Court held that before sanctioning the Board's 
exercise of jurisdiction "'there must be present the affirmative 
intention of the Congress clearly expressed.'" !d., at 21-22 
(quoting Benz v. Compa;nia Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U. S. 138, 
147 (1957) ) . 
The values enshrined in the First Amendment plainly rank 
high "in the scale of our na.tional values.'' In keeping with 
the Court's prudential policy it is incumbent on us to deter-
mine whether the Board's exercise of its jurisdiction here 
would give rise to serious constitutional questions. If so, we \ 
must first identify "the affirmative intention of the Cougress 
clearly expressed" before concluding that the Act grants 
jurisdiction. 
v 
In recent decisions involving aid to parochial schools we 
have recognized the critical and unique role of the teacher in 
fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school. What was 
said of the schools in Lemon v. Kurtzma;n, 403 U.S. 602, 617 
( 1971) , is true of the schools in this case: "Religious author-
ity necessarily pervades the school system." The key role 
playt>u by teachers in such a school system has been the 
predicate for our conclusions that govern men tal aid channeled 
through teachers creates an impermissible risk of excessive 
governmental entanglement in the affairs of the church-
opt>rated schools. For example, in Lemon, supra, at 617, we 
wroli<' • 
" ln terms of potential for wvolving some aspect of faith 
or morals ttl secular subjects, a textbook's content is 
ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of a subject is not. 
We cannot ignore the uanger that a teacher under reli-
gwus control and disciplint> poses to the separation of the 
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religious from the purely secular aspects of pre-college 
education. The conflict of functions inheres in the 
situation." (Emphasis added.) 
Only recently we again noted the importance of the teach-
er's function in a church school: "Whether the subject is 
'remedial reading,' 'advanced reading,' or simply 'reading,' a 
teacher remains a teacher, and the danger that religious 
doctrine will become intertwined with secular instruction per-
sists." Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U. S. 349, 370 (1975). Cf. 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 244 (1977); Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, supra, at 635 (Justice Douglas concurring). Good 
intentions by government--or third parties-can no more 
avoid entanglement with the religious mission of the school 
in the adversary setting of collective bargaining than in the 
well motivated legislative efforts we found unacceptable in 
Lemon, Meek, and Wolman. 
The Board argues that it ca.n avoid excessive entanglement 
since it will resolve only factual issues such as whether an 
anti-union animus motivated an employer's action. But at ' y 
this stage of our consideration we are not compelled to deter-
mine whether the entanglement is excessive as we would 
were we considering the constitutional issue. Rather, our 
in uir is directed toward determinin whether there IS a 
significant risk that the First Amendment will e infringed. 
- Moreover-:-it is already clear that the Board's actions will 
go beyond resolving factual issues. The Court of Appeals' 
opinion refers to charges of unfair labor practices filed against 
religious schools. 559 F. 2d, at 1125, 1126. The court ob-
served that in those cases the schools had responded that 
their challenged actions were mandated by their religious 
creeds. The resolution of such charges by the Board, in many 
mstances, will necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith 
of the position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its 
relationship to the school's religious mission. It is not only 
the conclusions that may be reached by the Board which may 
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impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but the 
very process of inquiry leading to finding and conclusions.10 
The Board's exercise of jurisdiction will have at least one 
other impact on church-operated schools. The Board will be 
called upon to decide what are "terms and conditions of 
employmellt" and therefore manda.tory subjects of bargaining. 
Sec 29 U. S. C. ~ 158 (d). Although the Board has not 
interpreted that phrase as it relates to educational institu-
tions, similar state provisions provide insight into the effect of 
mandatory bargaining. The Oregon Court of Appeals noted, 
"nearly everything that goes ou in the schools affects teachers 
and is therefore arguably a 'condition of employment.' " 
Spr-ingfield Education Assocwtion v. Springfield School Dis-
trict No. 19, 24 Ore. App. 751, 759, 547 P. 2d 647, 650 (1976). 
The Peunsylvania Supreme Court aptly summarized the 
effect of maudatory bargaming when it observed that the 
''mtroduction of a concept of mandatory collective bargaining, 
regardless of how narrowly the scope of negotiations is defined, 
necessarily represents an encroachment upon the former 
autonomous position of management." Pennsylvania Labor 
Relations Board v. Statz College Area School District, 461 
Pa. 494, 504, 337 A. 2d 262, 267 (1975). Cf. Clark County 
School District v. Local Government Employee Management 
Relatwns Board, 530 P. 2d 114, 117-118 (Nev. 1974). See 
M. Lieberman and M. Moskow, Collective Negotiations for 
Teachers 221-247 (1966). Congress has plainly authorized 
such encroachment upon the former autonomous position of 
management; our later discussion will take note that Congress 
has not done so on the historic autonomy of church-operated 
schools. Inevitably the Board's inquiry will implicate sensi-
tive issues that open the door to conflicts between clergy-
Ill Tlus kind of inquiry and n:; ,;ent>Itivily is illustrated in the examma~ 
non of ;\JonsJgnor O'Donnell by the Board's Hearing Officer, which .is 
reprodueed nt an tl[lJlt>ndJx to t h1:; opmion, 
,, 
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administrators and the Board, or conflicts with negotiators for 
unious. \Vhat we said in Lemon, supra, at 616, applies as 
·well here : 
" . parochial schools involve subs tau tial religious 
activity and purpose. 
"The substantial religious character of these church-
r-elated schools gives rise to entangling church-state rela-
tionships of thP kind the Religion Clauses sought to 
avoid." 
Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized this in his coucurring opinion 
in Lemon, noting "the admitted and obvious fact that the 
rmso11 d'etre of parochial schools is the propagation of reli-
gious faith. " Id., at 628. 
The church-teacher relationship ill a church-operated school 
differs from the employment relationship in a public or other 
non-religious school. We see no escape from such conflicts 
flowing from the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over church-
opc>rated schools and the consequeut serious First Amendment 
questions that would follow. We therefore turn to au exam-
mation of the National Labor Relations Act to decide whether 
it must be r0ad to con er jurisdiction that would in turn 
require a decision on the constitutional claims raised by 
respolH]eu ts. 
VI 
•rhere is no clear expression of CongTess' affirmative inten-
tlOn that teachers in church-operated schools should be 
cowred by the Act. Congress, however, defined the Board's 
.iurisdiction ill very broad terms and we must therefore exam-
ine the legislative history of the Act to determine WEe!her 
Congress con ten1plate(J tliat tfie gran t of jurisdictiott would 
Inc! udP t<>achers in such schools. 
Itt enacting the ~ational Labor Helations Act in 1935, 
Congress sought to protect the right of American workers to 
bargain collectively. The concern that was repeated through-
out the debates was tlw need to assure workers the right to 
,. 
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organize to counterbalance the collective activities of em~ 
ployers' which had been authorized by the National Industrial 
Recovery Act. But congTessional attention focused on em-
ployment in private industry and on industrial recovery. 
See, e. y., 79 C'ong. Rec. 7573 (1935) (remarks of Sen. 
Wagner), 2 N. L. R. B .. Legislative History of the National 
Labor Relatious Act 1935, pp. 2341. 2343. 
Our examination of the statute and its legislative history ~ 
indicates that Congress simply gave no consideration to 
church-operated schools. One "straw in the wind'' is that the 
Senate Committee on Education and Labor chose a college 
professor's dispute with the college as an example of employer-
employee relations not covered by the Act. S. Rep. No. 573, 
74th Cong., 1st Sess., 7, 2 N. L. R. B., Legislative History of 
the National Labor Relations Act 1935. p. 2307. 
Congress' next major consideration of the jurisdiction of 
the Board came during the passage of the Labor Management 
Relatious Act of 1947. commonly known as the Taft-Hartley 
Act. Iu that Act Congress amended the definition of "em-
ployer" in § 2 of the original Act to exclude nonprofit hospi-
tals. 61 Stat. 136, 29 F. S.C. § 152 (2) (1970 ed.). There [ 
was some discussion of the scope of the Board's juriscliction 
but the consensus was that nouprofit institutions in general 
did not fall within the Board's jurisdiction because they did 
not affect commerce. See H. R. 3020, 80th Coug .. 1st Sess. 
(1947). 1 N. L. R. B .. Legislative History of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act. 1947. p. 34 (hereinafter Legislative 
History); H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong.. 1st Sess., 12 
(1947), 1 Legislative History. p. 303; H. R. Rep. No. 510, 
80th Cong .. 1st ~ess. , 3. 32 ( 1947), 1 Legislative History, pp. 
507. 536; 93 Coug. Rec. 4997 (1947). 2 Legislative History, 
p. 1464 lremarks of ~ens. Tydings and Taft). 11 
u The ~allonal L~thor Helations Act. was amended again when Congress 
pm;i:l?d thr Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo~me Act in 1959. 73 
Stat, 519. Tlwt Aet. mad<' no change::; in the definition of '·employer" and 
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Tlw most recent significant amenclmen t to the Act was 
passed in 1074, removing the exemption of nonprofit hospi- ,..-, 
tals. Pub. L. No. 93-360. 88 Stat. 395. The Board relies ( 
upon that amendment as showing that Congress approved 
the Board's exercise of jurisuiction over church-operated 
schools. A close examination of that legisla.tive history, how-
ewr. reveals nothing to indicate any affirmative intention 
that such schools be within tho Boa.rcl's jurisdiction. Since 
the Board did not assert j urisuiction over teachers in a 
church-operated school until after the 1974 anwndmont 
nothing in the history of the amenclmeJJt can be read as 
reflecting C'ongress' tacit approval of the Board's action. 
During the debate there were expressions of concern about 
the effect of the bill on employees of religious hospitals whose 
religious beliefs would not permit them to join a union. 120 
Cong. Rec. 12968, 16914 ( 1974). Legislative History of the 
Coverage of Nonprofit Hospitals under the National Labor 
Relations Act, 1974 (Committee Print prepared by the Sub-
committee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor a11d 
Public Welfare), 93J Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 118, 331 (1974) 
(remarks of Sen. Ervin and Rep. Erlenborn). The result of 
those concerns was an amenument which reflects congressional 
seusitivity to First Amenumeut guarantees: 
"Any employee of a health care institution who is a, 
member of and auheres to established and traditional 
tenets or teachings of a bona fiue religion, body, or sect 
which has historically held conscie11tious objections to 
joiniug or financially supporting labor organizations shall 
not be required to join or financially support any labor 
organization as a comlition of employment; except that 
such employee may be required, in lieu of periodic dues 
and initiation fees , to pay sums equal to such clues and 
the leg1~lative hi:<tory <:ontain~ uo referm0<' fo ('hurch-op(•rated :-whools. 
See genrrally :\f. L. R. B., L(•gi:;lafive History of tlw T .. thor-\{anagrmwt 
Heportilll{ and DJ:sclosurP A('l of 1959 
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initiation fees to a nonreligious charitable fund exempt 
from taxation under section 501 (c) (3) of Title 26, 
chosen by such employee from a list of at least three such 
funds, designated in a contract between such institution 
and a labor organization. or if the contract fails to desig~ 
nate such funds. then to any such fund chosen by the 
employee." 29 U. S. C. § 169. 
The absence of an "affirmative intention of the Congress 
clearly expressed" fortifies our conclusion that Congress never 
contemplated that church-operated schools would be required 
to grant recognition to uuions as bargaining agents for its 
teachers. 
The Board relies heavily upon Associated Press v. NLRB, 
301 U. 8. 103 (1937). There the Court held that the First 
Amendment was no bar to the applicatiou of the Act to the 
Associated Press. an organiza.tion engaged in collecting infor-
mation and news throughout the world and distributing it to 
its members. Perceiving nothing to suggest that application 
of the Act would infringe First Ameudment guarante<•s of 
press freedoms, the C'ourt sustained Board jurisdiction. I d., 
at 131- 132. Here, on the contrary, the record affords ample 
evidence that the Board 's exercise of jurisdiction over teach-
ers in church-operated schools would implicate the guaranters 
of the Religion Clauses. 
Accordingly. iu the absence of a clear expression of Con-
gress' intellt to bring teachers in church-operated schools 
within the jurisdiction of the Board, we decline to construe 
th<> Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to 
r<>solvc difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the 
guarantees of the First Amendmrnt .Religion Clauses. 
Affirmed. 
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APPENDIX 
Q [By Hearing Officer]. Now. we havf' had quit<> a hit of 
testimony already as to liturgies. and I don't want to b<'at a 
dead horse; but let me ask you one question: If you know. 
how many liturgies ar<> requit·ed at C'atholic parochial high 
schools, do you know? 
A. 1 thiuk our first problem with that would lw defining 
liturgies. That word would have many definitions. Do you 
want to go into that? 
Q. I believe you defined it before. is that correct, when 
you first testified'? 
A. I am uot sure. Let me try briefly to do it again. okay? 
Q. Yes. 
A. A liturgy can rang<' anywhere from the strictest sense-
of the word, which is the sacrifice of the Mass in the Roman 
Catholic terminology. It can go from that all th<> way down 
to a very informal group in what we call shared prayer. 
Two or thref' individuals praying together and reflecting 
their own reactions to a scriptural reading. All of these-and 
there is a big spectrum in between those two Pxtremes-all of 
these are popularly refprrecl to as liturgies. 
Q. T see. 
A. Now, possibly in repeating your question you could 
givC' me an idea of that spectrum, I could respond more 
accurately. 
Q. Well, let us stick with the formal Masses. Tf you 
know, how many Masses arE' required at Catholic parochial 
high schools? 
A. Some havE' none, none required. Some would have 
two or three during the year where what we call Holy Days 
of Obligation coincide with school days. Some schools on 
those days prefer to have a Mass within the school day so the· 
stu <.len ts attend there, rather than thPir parish churches. 
Some schools feel that is not a good idea; they would always· 
be in their parish church; so that varies a great deal from 
chool to sch00L 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
;§u:pumt <!Jllltrl of flrt ~h .§bUts 
'Jltla.sJri:n.gLtn. ~. <!J. 2llbi'!-~ 
January 18, 1979 
Re: No. 77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago 
Dear Chief: 
I have problems with the first paragraph of Part 
IV of your opinion, beginning on page nine and carrying 
over onto page ten. My difficulties with this paragraph 
are these: 
1. It seems to me to be so self-evident as to 
require no citation of authority that the Labor Board 
cannot act in violation of the Constitution. 
2. I am bothered by the use of cases discussing 
the extent of a power explicitly conferred upon Congress 
(i.~., the commerce power) as analogies for considering 
the impact of an explicit prohibition contained in the 
Bill of Rights (i.~., the First Amendment). 
3. The language you quote from the Reliance Fuel 
opinion suggests that it is the Court's duty in the 
present case to decide the constitutional issue. 
I 
If the paragraph in question were eliminated, I 
would have no difficulty whatever in joining your opinion 
for the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
.;§np-unu Qf411trlllf f:1rt ~b .;§tatts 
~llll fri:ngton. ~. <!f. 2!l.;tJI. ~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE January 18, 1979 
,. 
~ 1' ~. 
Re: No. 77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bishop 
of Chicago, et al. 
Dear Chief, 
I shall await the dissent in this 
case. 
The Chief Justice 
Sincerely yours, 
I' 
Copies to the Conference 
.. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
- .;§up-rtntt <!Jomt of tltt 2Jin.it.e~ ~hlftg 
'J!tirlUlJrbtgftltt. lQ. <!J. 2112)!..;1 J 
January 18, 1979 
. \ 
Re: No. 77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bi"'shop of Chicago 
Dear Chief: 
I, too, shall await the dissent in this case. 
The Chief Justice • 
cc : The Conferenc e 
\,.•( 
~npr~nu <qomt ~ t1tt ~~ ~tatt• 
Jru-Jtinghtn. ~.<If. 21l?~~ 
CHAMBERS OF' 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
January 18, 1979 
Re: 77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bishop 
of Chicago 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 77-752, 'LRB t~ Ch~cago · Btshqp o~ · Chicaqo 
The Chief Justice's opinion follows the line of 
analysis suggested by Justice Stewart at Conference, and 
tentatively approved by you. If exercise of the claimed 
jurisdiction by the Labor Board would raise serious 
constitutional problems, the Court will not construe the labor 
statute to create such jurisdiction unless Congress has clearly 
expressed its intent to do so. (Section IV of the opinion.) 
Grave constitutional issues are raised by the proposed 
assertion of jurisdiction. (Section v.) There is no clear 
expression of congressional intent to create such jurisdiction. 
(Section VI.) 
I think that you will want to join this opinion. 
There are two points, however, that would be worth raising with 
the Chief Justice. The first paragraph of Section IV, at p. 9, 
one 
distracts/trom the analysis. In the cases cited and quoted 
there, the Court was considering challenges to the Board's 
jurisdiction based on claims that the business of a particular 
employer did not affect interstate commerce. As those cases 
indicate, where the Commerce Clause limitation on congressional 
authority is implicated, the Court does not shy away from the 
constitutional question by seeking a construction of the 
statute that avoids the problem. Rather, it defines the scope 
of the statutory jurisdiciton by determining the actual scope 
of the commerce power. The Court takes this approach because 
the labor statute was enacted under the authority of the 
Commerce Clause. Accordingly, Congress must have had in mind 
the limits on that authority, and would have expressed any 
intent it might have had to exercise less than the full power. 
The opinion in the present case is premised, however, 
on the notion that with regard to constitutional limitations 
other than the Commerce Clause, the Court does not need to 
resolve the exact constitutional limits on Congress' power in 
order to determine the reach of the statute. Instead, as IAM 
v. Street (First Amendment) and McCulloch (separation of 
powers) indicate (see pp. 10-11 of the opinion), near these 
other constitutional boundaries on congressional power the 
Court will determine first whether Congress expressly extended 
the reach of the statute into the area of possible 




that when it enacted the labor statute, Congress did not 
consider all of the possible constitutional problems that might 
arise, and should not be presumed to have enacted a statute 
that would create such problems. The Chief Justice's opinion 
does not note or explain the different approach taken to 
Commerce Clause and to other constitutional limitations on the 
reach of the labor statute. Without such an explanation, it is 
difficult to square the first paragraph of Section IV with the~ 
the opinion. Further, nothing would be lost by ~~ 
--------------'-----~----- ~ 
remainder of 
simply deleting that paragraph. 
The Appendix reproduces testimony from the 
jurisdictional hearing regarding the ~ley _; chosls rather 
than from an unfair labor practice proceeding as implied at 
opinion, pp. 12-13 & n. 10. The opinion of theCA 7 in this 
... ....._ 
case contains references to several unfair labor practice 
proceedings that illustrate the intrusive nature of Board 
jurisdiction. See Petition for Certiorari, at 33a-35a. 
The other point at which the dissent will probably 
attack this opinion is its treatment of Associated · Press · v; 
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). Seep. 17 of the opinion. But I 
think that the Chief Justice has done as much with that case as 
he could do consistently with the approach adopted here. There 
was nothing in that case to suggest constitutional difficulties 
with Board jurisdiction over editorial writers at the AP; here, 
it seems likely that substantial constitutional problems will 
arise from Board jurisdiction. 
-. 
CHAMBE RS OF" 
.JUSTICE w ... ..J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
January 19, 1979 
RE: No. 77-752 N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
.§u:puuu <!feud of tltt 1Jtnittb .§taftg 
'Baglrhtgton, ~. <!f. 20,?J!.c1 
C HAMBE RS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
January 19, 1979 
Re: No. 77-752 - N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop 
of Chicago 
Dear Chief: 
I await the dissent. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 






~ I agree with Potter that the first paragraph of 
Part IV of your opinion probably detracts from the other-
wise consistent flow of your analysis. 
,:t 
Otherwise, I think you have written a fine opinion 
and, with the removal paragraph mentioned, will be 





~ttpt'ttnt Ofourl of tlrt 'Jttiltb ;%taftg 
.aslp:n:ghtn. ~. Qf. 2llbf~~ 
CHAMI!IERS 01'" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE January 22, 1979 
Re: 77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bishop 
Dear Potter: 
I agree I do not need the material beginning with the 
second sentence under Part IV and going to the bottom of 
that page. I am deleting it. However, I am not deleting 
the first sentence under Part IV. Your suggestion that we 
omit that which is "so self evident as to require no 
citation of authority" is a revolutionary one! Applied 
universally, it would cut down our writing vastly (which 
might be good). As it stands, it introduces the subject 
of Part IV. 
As is usual, there are a number of other stylistic 
changes, none of which go to substance. A new draft is at 
the printer. 
~ds, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 77-752, NLRB v Catholic Bishop of Chicaqo 
The Chief Justice has retained the first, the 
penultimate, and the final sentences of the first paragraph in 
Section IV of the first draft of his opinion. The resulting 
paragraph is confusing -- the first sentence remarks 
constitutional limits on the Board's actions, the second, one 
of the constitutional limits on congressional power. And the 
paragraph does nothing more than state the obvious. 
The Chief Justice has eliminated from the paragraph 
the troublesome references to NLRB v. Fainblatt and NLRB v. 
Reliance Fuel Corp. The dissent will tax him, no doubt, for 
failing to explain how those two cases and others like them 
square with the cases cited and relied upon at pp.10-11. See 
my previous memorandum concerning the Chief Justice's first 
draft. But at least with the removal of the references to 
Fainblatt and Rel' 1ance Fuel _;;;..;;:..:::..:..:...:::~~:__!_, the Chief Just· , 
no longer raises this lee s opinion itself 
unanswered question. 
__:z- t4~ .yfrr- fo/_/7 W/-1 
cyr /...v ck-,.-/_ 7/ ~ 
fo- .k.s/ /7' vw// em 






Y /c'c/rrfs 7 
~ d.s .f'M~ ~"'"'"l 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
j}u:prtmt Q}curlcf tlft 'J!tni:ttb j;ta±tg 
~a.GfringLm. ~. <!}. 21l.;t'!~ 
January 29, 1979 
/ 
Re: No. 77-752- NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago · 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 





JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~u:puntt ~llltrlcf tire 'J!tnit.dt ~taJrg 
';Was fri:nghm.;!D. ~ 2ll.;t JI. ~ 
February 8, 1979 
Re: No. 77-752, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago 
Dear Chief, 
/ 
This is to confirm that I join your op1n1on in 
the above case as recirculated on January 23, 1979. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
Re: 
~uprtmt Qf01trl l1f tqt ~ttitdt ~hUts 
'J.!ragqmgttm. ~. <!}. 2llbiJ!.~ 
March 1, 1979 
No. 77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bishop 
of Chicago, et al. 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me in your dissent 
in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
erne 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
;§uprtmt <Q'LtU.rl of tilt ~ni:f.t~ ..§taf.tg 
'Jlttaslrntgton. ~· <!f. zog;Jl.;l 
March 2, 1979 
.. 
Re: No. 77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi'cago 
Dear Bill : 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
, Sincerely, 
Mr. Ju s ti c e B r nnan 
cc : The Confe r e nee 
CHAMe£RS 0,. 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.iuprtnu QfDttd ltf tltt ~b .itafts 
11htslfinghm. ~. <!f. 21l,?.ll-~ 
March s, 1979 
/ 
Re: 77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc; The Conference 
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